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Anecdotal Experiments: evaluating evidence with few animals 
Mike Dacey 
 
Comparative psychology came into its own as a science of animal minds, so a standard story goes, when 
it abandoned anecdotes in favor of experimental methods. However, pragmatic constraints significantly 
limit the number of individual animals included in laboratories experiments. Studies are often published 
with sample sizes in the single digits, and sometimes samples of one animal. With such small samples, 
comparative psychology has arguably not actually moved on from its anecdotal roots. Replication failures 
in other branches of psychology have received substantial attention, but have only recently been 
addressed in comparative psychology, and have not received serious attention in the attending 
philosophical literature. I focus on the question of how to interpret findings from experiments with small 
samples, and whether they can be generalized to other members of the tested species. As a first step, I 
argue that we should view studies with extreme small sample sizes as anecdotal experiments, lying 
somewhere between traditional experiments and traditional anecdotes in evidential weight and 
generalizability. 
 
1. Animal Anecdotes and the Founding of Comparative Psychology 
Darwin’s views on evolution suggest that continuity across species is the rule. Evolution occurs 
when small changes build up slowly over long periods of time, so we should expect to see cross-species 
continuity in most traits. Nowhere was this result more significant than when it came to the mind. The 
fiercely-held conventional wisdom at the time was that human minds were entirely unlike animal minds. 
To challenge this conventional wisdom, Darwin reports anecdotes about various clever and heroic 
animals. For instance: 
“I will give only one other instance of sympathetic and heroic conduct in a little 
American monkey. Several years ago a keeper at the Zoological Gardens, showed me 
some deep and scarcely healed wounds on the nape of his neck, inflicted on him while 
kneeling on the floor by a fierce baboon. The little American monkey, who was a warm 
friend of this keeper, lived in the same large compartment, and was dreadfully afraid of 
the big baboon. Nevertheless, as soon as he saw his friend the keeper in peril, he rushed 
to the rescue . . .” (1871 pg. 75) 
This anecdotal approach continued in the work of George Romanes, Darwin’s appointed successor on 
psychological topics. Describing similar animal heroism, Romanes says (also reporting the story 
secondhand) that a column of ants “rushed to the rescue” of an individual pinned with a rock, and “This 
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observation seems unequivocal as proving fellow-feeling and sympathy, so far as we can trace any 
analogy between the emotions of the higher animals and those of insects” (1888 pp. 48-49). 
Near the turn of the 20th century, authors such as C. Lloyd Morgan (1894) and Edward Thorndike 
(1911) vocally disproved of the reliance on anecdotes. To be a science on firm founding, they felt, the 
field would need to shift to rigorous experimental methods. The resulting shift, so a common story goes, 
brought comparative psychology into its own as a rigorous science (e.g. Shettleworth 2012). 
It is easy to see what is objectionable about the way Darwin and Romanes use anecdotes. They relay 
the stories secondhand without scrutiny, and leap to a heroic interpretation without considering other 
explanations. There is also a particular worry that work on animal minds will be systematically biased by 
the unconscious human tendency to anthropomorphize; to interpret animal actions in the same ways they 
would interpret human actions (e.g. Dacey 2017). Narrative anecdotes seem particularly ripe for such a 
bias. They often presume intentions behind the action (as when we describe a reach for an object, or a 
glance towards a person), and often elicit emotional reactions and bonds with characters that may threaten 
impartial scientific analysis. 
To put it simply, rejecting anecdotes makes comparative psychology look more like other successful 
sciences (e.g. Thorndike 1911). Scientists across fields shun anecdotes. There are many reasons to do so. I 
attempt to summarize the key concerns about anecdotes below, listed to aid later discussion. These 
concerns overlap, and are not exhaustive: 
1. Anecdotes can be cherry-picked to make a predetermined point. 
2. We lack control over and knowledge of background conditions of anecdotes. 
3. Anecdotes are narrative in structure, rather than providing analyzable data. 
4. Anecdotes are non-repeatable (non-replicable), and so can’t be confirmed independently. 
5. Anecdotes don’t support generalization. 
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Performing controlled experiments can alleviate these concerns. One cannot pick and choose which 
individual responses in any given experiment to report (though one can choose which experiments to 
report, as discussed below). A good experiment is defined by control over the variables that might 
influence behavior. Experiments produce evidence in the form of data, which is cold, dispassionate, and 
suited for statistical analysis. As a result, when done well, experiments are replicable (worries noted in 
section 3), and they can support generalization. 
Summing up, anecdotes are usually opposed to experiments. A common foundation story for 
comparative psychology tells that it came into its own as a science when it chose experiments over 
anecdotes. However, it is not clear whether this foundation story holds up when we look at current 
practice. 
2. Sample Sizes in Animal Labs 
When running laboratory experiments on animals, practical constraints significantly restrict sample 
sizes. Animals must be kept and cared for, and labs can only afford and fit a certain number. Ethical 
concerns often dictate that the number of animals involved should be as low as possible.1 Individual 
experiments usually require time-consuming training, so some subset of the overall groups is chosen.2 
There are also often basic tasks that an animal must successfully perform to even participate in the 
experiment, and those of the original group chosen who fail will be excluded. I take these to be challenges 
intrinsic to the subject of study, and do not intend to criticize the researchers who face them. Nonetheless, 
the implications are stark. Experiments frequently include samples of individual animals in the single 
digits, and sometimes only 1 or 2. Figure 1 shows the number of individual animals included in every 
individual experiment published in four top journals in the field in 2019. Out of 151 experiments in 90 
papers, 50 experiments include data from 10 or fewer animals (nearly 1/3 of the total), and 98 include 
                                                          
1 Both of these issues are especially difficult with primates, and even more so with chimpanzees, as in my example 
below. 
2 Additionally, having been trained on one task may influence later performance on other experiments, so 
sometimes animals are excluded so that they remain ‘naïve’ to the tasks at hand. 
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data from fewer than 20 (nearly 2/3).3 To put it bluntly, these sample sizes would be unacceptable in other 
branches of psychology. 
As an illustrative example of the interpretive challenges raised by sample sizes like these, I will 
focus on Inoue & Matsuzawa’s 2007 paper, “Working memory of numerals in chimpanzees.” This paper 
compares human and chimpanzee performance on a short-term memory task. The authors state their 
conclusions unequivocally: “Our study shows that young chimpanzees have an extraordinary working 
memory capability for numerical recollection better than that of human adults” (pg. 1005). The paper has 
                                                          
3 Thanks to Abraham Brownell for performing this analysis. This data is not meant to present a statistically rigorous 
picture of the field at large, but simply to provide a reasonably representative snapshot. This illustrates the issue to 
those unfamiliar with the norms of the field. These journals are among the top that focus on animal cognition, and 
were chosen in large part to limit potentially subjective inclusion criteria. However, they are not the only such 
journals, and animal cognition studies are often published in more generalist journals as well (for instance, the 
example discussed below was published in Current Biology). Several of these experiments also divided participants 
into different conditions, further limiting the number of individuals observed making specific responses, though we 
did not analyse these divisions. 
 
Fig. 1: A histogram of all experiments published in the journals Animal Behavior and Cognition, Animal Cognition, Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, and Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition in the year 2019, sorted 
by number of individual animals in reported data. This includes 151 experiments described in 90 papers; any experiment 
that made an intervention, laboratory or field. 54 papers were excluded, as they did not present new behavioral data (29 
papers), were unable to report the number of animals involved (seven papers), were purely observational field studies (six 
papers), or used only human subjects (12 papers). 
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been cited extensively, and in the media, this conclusion was accepted uncritically (“Chimps Exhibit 
Superior Memory, Outshining Humans,” New York Times 12/4/2007). 
The task was as follows. Participants (human and chimpanzee alike) sit in front of a computer 
screen. The computer quickly flashes several digits in random locations on the screen (all shown 
simultaneously). After a presentation of a few hundred milliseconds (650, 430, and 210 ms in different 
trials), each digit is masked with a small white square. Participants were asked to then tap each masking 
square in order of the digits previously at each location. The researchers measured both response times 
and accuracy. The task is meant to test the ability to rapidly store working memories for the visual scene 
(210 ms is too fast to saccade through the sequence). 
Inoue and Matsuzawa begin the study with 6 chimpanzees (three mother-child pairs; there were 14 
total on-site). While all six were able to learn the basic masking task, only four performed at the level of 
five numerals, which was the number used in the key test (Supplemental materials Table S1). So, the 
experiments include these four animals. The actual data presented, however, only compares one 
chimpanzee at a time against a human average (human n=9 in one experiment, n=12 in another). So for 
each actual comparison, chimpanzee n=1. In fact, the assertion that chimpanzees perform better than 
humans seems to be based on a single chimpanzee, Ayumu, the best chimpanzee performer (see figure 2). 
Based on the data presented in supplemental material (see figure 3), Ayumu matched the human average 
accuracy rate with 650 ms presentation times, but still had a lower accuracy rate than the majority of the 
individual humans.4 So they key claim here seems to be based on a simple size of one. 
Given this reliance on extremely small sample sizes, we must question whether the field has really 
moved on from its anecdotal roots. I suggest that performance of animals like Ayumu is just another kind 
of anecdote; it’s a single animal (or very small number) displaying an interesting behavior. It can be hard 
                                                          
4 All three chimpanzees shown did show faster response times than all humans (response time was measured as 
the latency before the first number was touched). 
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to know exactly what conclusions we can draw from a study like this. At the very least, though. findings 
like this cannot ground general claims like “chimpanzees outperform humans.”5  
This study is a particularly salient example, both in the sense that it reaches the limit case of n=1, and 
in its strong conclusion and broad uptake. But the core concerns here generalize, given the number of 
experiments published with extremely small sample sizes. To be clear, these restrictions result from 
practical issues intrinsic to the field. I do not criticize researchers for this, as I see no reasonable way 
around it (absent massive funding increases and means to address ethical concerns).  
3. The replication crisis and comparative psychology 
In recent years, other branches of psychology have instituted reforms to address prominent and 
repeated replication failures (Romero 2019). Despite the obvious worry that small sample sizes leave 
comparative psychology vulnerable to these same problems, the field has only just begun to respond 
(Beran 2018, Farrar, Boekle, & Clayton 2020). Stevens (2017) notes that comparative psychology makes 
frequent use of within-subjects methods6 that might protect the field compared to social psychology. 
                                                          
5 This is compounded by the fact that Ayumu here is an outlier among even the top performers: only those 
individuals able to perform the basic task were included, and Ayumu’s performance was an outlier among them. 
There are also concerns that the life-history of laboratory animals makes them unrepresentative. 
6 I note that within-subjects statistical analyses may be more likely replicate even with few individuals, but those 
methods do not help the problem of generalizing findings to other members of the species. 
 
Fig. 2: Data from Inoue & Matsuzawa 2007 
(pg. R1005). Two chimpanzees, Ayumu and Ai 
are compared to a human average. 
 
 
Figure 3: Data from Inoue & Matsuzawa 2007, with 650 ms 
presentation of stimuli before mask (supplemental materials, 
figure S2). This is the same condition as the leftmost data-points 
of figure 2, this page. 
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However, he says, there are several reasons to think that comparative psychology is vulnerable to 
replication failures. He makes several recommendations for the field to address these concerns. Some of 
these recommendations have also begun to be implemented. I will focus here on recommendations that 
inform the current discussion. 
One such recommendation is for researchers to pre-register their methods before the test, or for 
journals to adopt the practice of registered reports, in which a journal accepts or rejects a paper based on 
methods alone, before experiments are run. This practice has grown in fields like social psychology. The 
purpose is to prevent fishing-expedition approaches to studies and statistical analyses: These can lead to 
cherry-picking which studies are reported, and P-hacking by, for instance, simply trying various statistical 
analyses until one gets a significant result. In 2018, the journal Animal Behavior and Cognition began 
accepting registered reports (Vonk & Kraus 2018), though the editors report that uptake by researchers 
has been slow (Beran 2020). 
Worries about sample size are more complicated. For instance, social psychology has massively 
increased sample sizes in their studies simply by making greater use of online platforms like Mechanical 
Turk and Qualtrics. Comparative psychology has no such option. And indeed, for reasons noted above, it 
seems impossible to completely avoid small sample sizes. Nonetheless, Stevens does make some 
recommendations that can help. First, different labs can collaborate and combine their subject pool. In 
fact, the ManyPrimates Project was launched in 2019 to facilitate collaboration across labs spanning the 
globe, allowing for larger and more diverse samples in studies of primate cognition (Many Primates et al. 
2019). Secondly, he suggests that researchers can take advantage of facilities like zoos that may have 
larger numbers of animals available. Thirdly, researchers can reconsider their choice of species, either by 
running studies pooling multiple species, or by switching to species that are easily available in the 
community, such as dogs. 
I have little to add on recommendations regarding species choice, but I will take on-board the rest of 
the recommendations I’ve mentioned. While the recommendations aimed at increasing sample size are 
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unlikely to completely address the problem (they simply cannot have an impact like we’ve seen in social 
psychology), they certainly help. Registered reports are also valuable; if papers are evaluated based on 
methods rather than results, it will significantly impact our interpretation of studies will small sample 
sizes in ways I discuss below (section 6). 
Even large-scale changes are not likely to completely address sample size worries in comparative 
psychology. But even if they do in the future, we should still consider how to interpret existing small 
sample studies. Either way, interpretive challenges remain. To face these challenges, we can start by look 
to other research programs that employ very small samples, or even samples of one. To the extent these 
programs are analogous to comparative psychology, they might provide concrete suggestions. 
4. Candidate Analogue One: Cognitive Neuroscience 
Lesion studies in cognitive neuroscience present the first candidate analogue. In many of these 
studies, researchers test a single patient with known brain damage on a battery of tasks aimed at 
delimiting a certain cognitive capacity.7 Studies like this generally focus on two kinds of question. The 
first are questions about the neural underpinnings of a particular cognitive capacity. Here, the goal is 
locating damage, and correlating it with deficits. The second are the so-called dissociations of capacities 
that might otherwise be thought to be expressions of a single system. For instance, if a deficit in 
experiential memory does not also bring with it a deficit in memories for facts, then we have reason to 
believe that the two are separate capacities subserved be separate systems (episodic and semantic 
memory), and moreover, the intact capacity does not require the damaged capacity. 
The evidential value of lesion studies has long been controversial. As a result, there is a substantial 
literature aimed at uncovering the methodological assumptions behind the research (e.g. Caramazza 1986, 
Bub & Bub 1988, McClosky & Caramazza 1988, Glymour 1994, Shallice 2015). The actual damage and 
                                                          
7 As in the Matsuzawa study, these individuals are also outliers; they are chosen precisely because their 
performance is abnormal. 
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deficits observed in individuals vary substantially, and the ‘clean’ cases of a particular deficit are rare. As 
a result, it can be difficult to know what aspects of any study can be generalized. Arguably, these 
concerns, along with improvements in other methods, have driven a reduction in reliance on lesion studies 
in recent decades. However, if one is dealing with lesion studies, the focus on a specific individual is 
arguably (but controversially) an advantage. The very fact that individual deficits vary so much means 
that effects would likely wash out in any cohort study, leaving them impossible to interpret (Caramazza 
1986). 
Even so, there is at least one kind of general claim that these studies do seem to license. These are 
claims about the necessity of one capacity for another, as made in dissociation studies. If Task A can be 
performed by an individual who cannot perform Task B, then it cannot be the case that the capacity 
responsible for performance of Task A is necessary for performance on Task B.8 This inference can be 
transferred. For instance, the fact that Ayumu was able to do so well on the memory task without using 
language suggests that language is not required. Necessity claims are strong claims though, especially for 
a field like psychology, where pretty much everything can vary across individuals. So, the denial of a 
necessity claim may not always be hugely informative. Nonetheless, even if this is a limited result, it’s 
something. 
5. Candidate Analogue Two: Anecdotes in Cognitive Ethology 
Researchers in cognitive ethology will also sometimes report anecdotes, or “incident reports” of 
particular observed behaviors. As with lesion studies, this practice is controversial (Mitchell, Thompson, 
& Miles 1997). In general, data based on repeated observation is preferred, if possible. Even so, incident 
reports reports may describe low-frequency behaviors, that would be difficult to observe frequently or to 
elicit in a laboratory setting. They can also introduce behaviors that researchers had been wholly unaware 
of. Field anecdotes can also arguably provide some evidence about cognitive processes on their own: field 
                                                          
8 This basic inference structure is also employed in developmental psychology, though with larger sample sizes 
(Perner & Lang 1999). 
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observations don’t face any concerns about ecological validity, and anecdotes can often supply richer 
context about the individual behaving and its context than experiment (Mitchell 1997).9 
Nonetheless, incident reports do suffer from the limitations described above, with concerns about 
anthropomorphism and generalizability at the fore. Indeed, the use of anecdotes has been declining in 
primatology (Ramsay & Teichroeb 2019), suggesting that the downside of anecdotes is winning out in the 
minds of researchers. Even if these anecdotes do not provide much evidential value, they have heuristic 
value in generating hypotheses, guiding future observation or experimentation, and identifying behaviors 
worthy of more systematic study (Silverman 1997¸ Andrews 2020).  
6. Anecdotal Experiments 
As a start towards coming to grips with the sample size problem in comparative psychology, I argue 
that we should view studies with extreme small samples sizes as anecdotal experiments. Anecdotal 
experiments have some of the strengths that are usually ascribed to well-designed experiments (they are 
controlled and meticulously recorded), and some of the weaknesses ascribed to standard anecdotes (they 
may not be reliably repeatable, and they do not support straightforward generalization to other 
individuals). They occupy a middle-ground, providing stronger evidence than that provided by a one-off 
observation, but not as strong as that provided by experiments with larger sample sizes. 
To illustrate more specifically, I return to the concerns lodged against anecdotes in section 1. 
Anecdotal experiments avoid the most significant concerns, while the rest could be lodged against these 
studies anyway. I’ll work through each in turn. 
Concern 1: Anecdotes can be cherry-picked to make a predetermined point. 
This worry can be avoided by making use of registered reports, such that papers are accepted based on 
methods, before experiments are done. It remains a worry that existing studies report cherry-picked 
                                                          
9 Mitchell advocates specifically for anthropomorphic anecdotes as a way to conceptualize behavior. I set the issue 
of anthropomorphism aside for now, as I see it as less of a concern here (see next section). 
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experiments, though perhaps not to the degree of full anecdotes: the number of individual behaviors one 
might observe and dismiss in reporting an anecdote is much less than the number of experiments one 
might perform and dismiss. 
Concern 2: We lack control over and knowledge of background conditions of anecdotes. 
This worry does not apply here to any greater degree than it does in psychology generally. A well-
designed experiment controls immediate background conditions, such that we can have a reasonable idea 
of what features of the task the animal is responding to. 
Concern 3: Anecdotes are non-repeatable (non-replicable), and so can’t be confirmed 
independently. 
Anecdotal experiments have records of methods, which make replication possible. However, replication 
problems in other areas suggest that comparative psychology should be concerned about replicability 
(Farrar, Boekle, & Clayton 2020). Perhaps the focus on within-subject tests puts comparative psychology 
in somewhat better position than it might be otherwise (Stevens 2017), but the extremely small sample 
sizes suggest that replicability cannot be assumed. This is a worry either way, and framing these as the 
anecdotal experiments can make it more explicit. 
Concern 4: Anecdotes are narrative in structure, rather than providing analyzable data. 
Anecdotal experiments do rely on data, so seem to pass this test. Nonetheless, we should be careful in 
what we take that data to show. If, as just suggested, we should question the replicability of these studies, 
statistics can mislead. A careful reevaluation of statistical measures can help here (as in social 
psychology). However, absent that, statistics can present a false sense of generalizability. For instance, we 
can statistically show that Ayumu himself reliably outperforms the human sample average in this study. 
What that means about chimpanzees more generally is a different question. 
Concern 5: They don’t support generalization. 
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As with concern 3, this is just to recognize limits already present. It is common to restate an experimental 
finding by simply plugging generics into a literal description of the study. For instance: “Ayumu 
outperformed the average performance of twelve humans in our study” becomes “chimpanzees 
outperform humans.” This move is clearly too quick. If we have good reason to believe that a study 
includes a representative sample of a larger population, we generalize to that population. These 
generalizations should become more tentative as confidence in the representativeness of the sample 
increases. With very few animals, we can’t generalize this way. This is compounded by the fact that the 
animals performing in these experiments, like Ayumu, are often outliers. 
Treating experiments with extremely small sample sizes as anecdotal experiments marks their 
limitations, and helps guide their proper use. There are many important unanswered questions here. We 
would want to know how to determine which experiments are anecdotal and which are not; where is the 
cut-off? Moreover, in light of the interpretive limitations of anecdotal experiments, I have said little about 
what, concretely, we can learn from them. I will offer some brief comments on that topic here. 
The fact that one member of a species is able to perform a task to a certain criterion shows that it is 
possible for some members of that species to do so. However, this doesn’t guarantee any particular 
cognitive mechanism. Though, we can follow work in cognitive neuroscience and conclude that 
successful performance shows that some capacity believed to be absent (say, language) is not necessary 
for performance on the task. They may also provide some evidence for one hypothesized mechanism over 
another if that level of performance is impossible or highly implausible according to the devalued 
hypothesis. Absent such strong claims, one competing hypothesis may still predict better performance on 
a task (this is not the aim of the Inoue & Matsuzawa study). If so, a convincing finding of strong 
performance might provide a small (minute, even) amount of evidence for that hypothesis. Additionally, 
following cognitive ethology, the fact that at least one individual succeeds in a task might motivate new 
hypotheses about the cognitive capacities involved, or identify new areas worthy of further study. These 
are useful conclusions, but they are not often deeply helpful in evaluating models of the actual cognitive 
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processes involved. Psychological models rarely make claims of possibility or impossibility, and one 
cannot conclude a capacity is not necessary for the task unless one is confident the animal does not 
possess that capacity (most of the interesting options are still up in the air). 
Even with these limitations in scope and strength, any generalization from an extremely small 
sample to a species at large must be significantly hedged: these individuals might just be doing something 
completely different than other members of the species.10 But even so limited, there is still value to that 
evidence. Often when it comes to nonhuman minds, strong evidence is very hard to come by, so any 
amount of evidence is worth considering. 
7. Implications and Conclusion 
The basic point of framing extreme small sample studies as anecdotal experiments is to reduce their 
weight in general claims about the nature of nonhuman cognitive capacities. Indeed, I argue that the field 
ought to reduce the evidential weight of individual experiments in general, to help move away from a 
pernicious ‘critical experiment’ framing that still too often pervades. The actual evidential value of 
individual experiments must be assessed on a case by case basis, depending on the kind of model being 
evaluated, and the nature of the anecdotal experiment. This is tough work of course, but it always has 
been. 
There may be other general impacts on the field. This framing could benefit the field by encouraging 
more exploratory research and reporting of more varied behaviors. In effect, experimental comparative 
psychology might look a bit more like field ethology. For example, Stanton et al. (2017) presented 
raccoons with the Aesop’s fable task, in which they can gain access to a treat floating on water by 
dropping stones in to raise the water level. They report that one of the raccoons managed to get the treat, 
not by dropping stones, but by ripping the entire apparatus off the floor and dumping it out. A field that 
                                                          
10 I have ignored worries about ecological validity and differences between captive and wild animals, but they 
would have to be considered in addressing this possibility. 
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relies on registered reports, and recognizes the limitations of data from such small sample sizes would 
likely include substantially more reports of behavior like this. There is value to that, as these behaviors, 
intended by the experimenter or not, do provide insight into the animals. 
Most importantly, though, this framing encourages more honest reporting of the significance of 
studies. Extreme low sample size studies are limited in evidential value. Reporting them as anecdotal 
experiments presents them as such. 
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